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VICTORIES FOR PRIVACY AND LOSSES 
FOR JOURNALISM?                                       
FIVE PRIVACY CONTROVERSIES FROM 
2004 AND THEIR POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
FOR THE FUTURE OF REPORTAGE 
Clay Calvert∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
A primary role of the press in a democratic society, protected 
broadly in the United States under the First Amendment,1 is to 
fairly, truthfully, and comprehensively report to citizens on matters 
of public concern.2 The ethics code of the Radio-Television News 
                                                          
       ∗ Associate Professor of Communications & Law and Co-Director of the 
Pennsylvania Center for the First Amendment at The Pennsylvania State 
University. B.A., 1987, Communication, Stanford University; J.D. (Order of the 
Coif), 1991, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific; Ph.D., 1996, 
Communication, Stanford University. Member, State Bar of California. The 
author thanks David Johnson of the McGeorge School of Law for his editing 
assistance and review of a draft of this manuscript. 
      1 The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in relevant 
part that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of 
the press.” U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added). The Free Speech and Free 
Press Clauses have been incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment Due 
Process Clause to apply to state and local government entities and officials. See 
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). 
2 The code of ethics of one major journalism organization provides: 
Members of the Society of Professional Journalists believe that public 
enlightenment is the forerunner of justice and the foundation of 
democracy. The duty of the journalist is to further those ends by 
seeking truth and providing a fair and comprehensive account of events 
and issues. Conscientious journalists from all media and specialties 
strive to serve the public with thoroughness and honesty. 
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Directors Association, for instance, advances a policy that 
admonishes broadcast journalists to “pursue truth aggressively and 
present the news accurately, in context, and as completely as 
possible.”3 In addition to this pivotal role as truthteller, the press 
plays a vital function as a watchdog or unofficial Fourth Estate, 
checking and exposing government abuses of power.4 
There are, however, social and legal concerns at loggerheads 
with policies that permit, privilege, and promote an aggressive 
press. In particular, privacy, which Professor Anita Allen recently 
described as “a dominant theme in public policy in the United 
States,”5 often conflicts and competes with the jobs of journalists 
by denying them access to information or images that the public is 
interested in receiving.6 For instance, the common law tort of 
intrusion into seclusion restricts journalists’ ability to gather 
information while safeguarding individual privacy of both space 
and action.7 California’s anti-paparazzi law also protects privacy 
                                                          
Society of Professional Journalists’ Code of Ethics, available at http://www. 
spj.org/ethics_code.asp (last visited Jan. 5, 2005). 
3 Radio-Television News Directors Association Code of Ethics and 
Professional Responsibility, available at http://www.rtnda.org/ethics/coe. shtml 
(last visited Jan. 5, 2005). 
4 As Columbia University Professor Herbert Gans recently wrote, the 
watchdog role represents “the journalists’ finest opportunity to show that they 
are working to advance democracy.” HERBERT J. GANS, DEMOCRACY AND THE 
NEWS 79 (2003). Whether the press actually plays this role today, however, is 
up for debate. See Marty Kaplan, The Armstrong Effect, DAILY VARIETY, Jan. 
19, 2005, at 60 (contending that “[b]y and large, neither politicians nor 
entertainment executives regard the press as a check on the abuse of power, or 
as the representatives of the public. They regard journalists as nuisances—useful 
idiots”). 
5 Anita L. Allen, 2003 Daniel J. Meador Lecture: Privacy Isn’t Everything: 
Accountability as a Personal and Social Good, 54 ALA. L. REV. 1375, 1375 
(2003). 
6 See generally Sandra F. Chance, The First Amendment in the New 
Millennium: How a Shifting Paradigm Threatens the First Amendment and Free 
Speech, 23 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 169, 174-75 (2000) (describing a 
number of legislative initiatives and policies designed to protect privacy that 
negatively affect journalists’ ability to gather information). 
7 See, e.g., Marich v. MGM/UA Telecommunications, Inc., 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
60 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (describing the elements of the tort of intrusion into 
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against journalists who might engage in either physical or 
constructive trespasses to obtain images of, as the statute puts it, 
“personal or familial activities.”8 In brief, as the author of this 
article and a colleague argued elsewhere in 2004, “the First 
Amendment is not a license to destroy an individual’s privacy.”9 
On the other hand, journalists often assert and claim privacy 
interests of their own when gathering news, such as keeping 
private and confidential the names of sources who have supplied 
them with important information. As Eugene Volokh, a professor 
of law at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), 
recently wrote, “[T]ips from confidential sources often help 
journalists (print or electronic) uncover crime and misconduct. If 
journalists had to reveal such sources, many of these sources 
would stop talking.”10 
This article examines five separate issues and controversies 
that arose in 2004, each involving privacy, and analyzes their 
potential impact on the practice and policies of journalism and the 
free flow of information to the public in 2005 and beyond. In one 
instance, as this article argues, the odds of a particular privacy 
concern immediately impacting journalists are minimal. On the 
other hand, the implications of the other four privacy controversies 
addressed here may well have a profound and lasting effect on 
reporters and the press, and on how they perform the democratic 
duties mentioned at the start of this article.11 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
seclusion). 
8 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8 (2004). 
9 Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, Suing the Media, Supporting the First 
Amendment: The Paradox of Neville Johnson and the Battle for Privacy, 67 
ALB. L. REV. 1097, 1109 (2004). 
10 Eugene Volokh, You Can Blog, But You Can’t Hide, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 
2004, at A39. 
11 See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text (describing the truth-seeking 
and truth-telling obligations of journalists imposed by ethics codes). 
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Drawing from an eclectic mix of both legislative measures and 
courtroom decisions, the five privacy issues addressed in this 
article are: 
 
1.  The federal Video Voyeurism Prevention Act of 2004,12 
signed into law on December 23, 2004 by President George 
W. Bush,13 and impacting the use of miniature cameras, 
camera phones, and video recorders in public places; 
 
2.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s March 2004 decision in 
National Archives and Records Administration v. Favish,14 
which significantly expands a privacy exemption of the 
federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)15 in order to 
protect the privacy interests of relatives of the dead; 
 
3. The Supreme Court of Colorado’s July 2004 opinion in 
Colorado v. Bryant16 protecting the privacy interest of a 
complaining witness in a sexual assault case over the 
media’s right to disseminate truthful and lawfully obtained 
information about an event of public significance involving 
basketball superstar Kobe Bryant, and the efforts of 
California trial court judge Rodney S. Melville to keep 
private numerous details of the sexual assault case pending 
against music superstar Michael Jackson;17 
 
                                                          
12 18 U.S.C. § 1801 (2005); Pub. L. No. 108-495. 
13 See generally Bruce Alpert, La. Victim Hails Voyeur Law, TIMES-
PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Dec. 30, 2004, at 1 (describing the new law and some 
of the reasons for its enactment). 
14 541 U.S. 157 (2004). 
15 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2004). 
16 94 P.3d 624 (Colo. 2004), stay denied, 125 S. Ct. 1 (2004). 
17 See generally Adam Liptak, Privacy Rights, Fair Trials, Celebrities and 
the Press, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2004, at A20 (writing that “in the Jackson case, 
Judge Rodney S. Melville of Santa Barbara County Superior Court has issued a 
series of orders barring the release of essentially all information concerning 
evidence and potential witnesses’ identities”). 
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4. A federal district court’s August 2004 decision in 
Turnbull v. American Broadcasting Companies18 refusing 
to grant summary judgment for the media defendants on 
multiple causes of action based on the surreptitious 
recording of conversations by a producer for the television 
newsmagazine 20/20; and 
 
5. Multiple battles across the United States in 2004 
involving the efforts of journalists, such as Matthew 
Cooper,19 Judith Miller,20 and James Taricani,21 to keep 
private the names of confidential sources after those 
journalists and their news agencies were called upon in 
court to reveal the sources’ identities. 
 
When considered collectively, the five subjects analyzed in this 
article, which cut across the privacy landscape, reveal a startling 
and disturbing finding for working journalists—that the privacy 
interests of others either prevailed or were expanded in all of the 
above situations, with the lone exception being when journalists 
                                                          
18 32 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2442 (C.D. Cal. 2004). 
19 In re Special Counsel Investigation, 346 F. Supp. 2d 54 (D.D.C. 2004) 
(denying the request of Time magazine reporter Matthew Cooper to quash 
subpoenas issued by Special Counsel Patrick Fitzgerald as part of an ongoing 
investigation into the potentially illegal disclosure of the identity of CIA covert 
operative Valerie Plame). 
20 In re Special Counsel Investigation, 338 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 2004) 
(denying the motion of New York Times investigative reporter Judith Miller to 
quash grand jury subpoenas served upon her as part of the ongoing investigation 
into the potentially illegal disclosure of the identity of CIA covert operative 
Valerie Plame). 
21 In re Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 2004) (affirming and 
upholding a civil contempt order against Taricani for refusing to give up the 
name of the individual who leaked to him a surveillance videotape). See Pam 
Belluck, Reporter Who Shielded Source Will Serve Sentence at Home, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 10, 2004, at A28 (describing how James Taricani, an award-
winning reporter for a Rhode Island television station, was sentenced “to six 
months of home confinement for refusing to reveal who gave him an F.B.I. 
videotape that was evidence in a investigation of government corruption in 
Providence”). 
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themselves asserted privacy interests in the name of gathering and 
disseminating news. Parsed differently and more bluntly, privacy 
rights grew except when journalists needed them to grow. The year 
2004, in brief, was not a good one for journalists when confronting 
legislative and judicial concerns regarding privacy interests. But 
because the issues discussed here will not disappear in 2005 and 
beyond, journalists and news agencies must learn from these 
negative results and adopt new policies and approaches both to 
newsgathering and the judicial challenges they encounter. 
I. PRIVACY IN PUBLIC PLACES?: THE VIDEO VOYEURISM 
PREVENTION ACT OF 2004 
In 2000, the author of this article first identified a growing 
problem caused by the development of miniaturized technology 
that had outpaced the current state of privacy law—the deviant and 
prurient use of tiny, backpack-hidden cameras in public places to 
take pictures underneath the skirts or dresses of girls and women, 
and the posting of those photographs, descriptively known as 
upskirts, on the World Wide Web.22 The problem from a legal 
perspective was that most of the upskirting occurred in public 
places—malls and parks—where, under traditional legal policy, 
people simply do not possess a reasonable expectation of privacy.23 
As I elaborated in a book at that time: 
Backpacks and bags are the precise kind of tool employed 
by many so-called upskirt voyeurs. They drop a backpack 
near the feet of a woman standing in line and then hope that 
the covert camera, buried within but with its lens 
unobstructed and pointing upward, gets a crisp shot of the 
woman’s underwear or lack thereof.24 
Today, five years later, the problem of upskirt voyeurism has 
                                                          
22 Clay Calvert & Justin Brown, Video Voyeurism, Privacy, and the 
Internet: Exposing Peeping Toms in Cyberspace, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. 
L.J. 469 (2000). 
23 Id. at 489. 
24 CLAY CALVERT, VOYEUR NATION: MEDIA, PRIVACY, AND PEERING IN 
MODERN CULTURE 126 (2000). 
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not gone away but, in fact, has been exacerbated by the rapid 
growth and development of camera phones.25 As a reporter for one 
newspaper observed in August 2004, “Some people have used 
camera phones as technological peepholes to take photographs up 
women’s skirts and post them on a growing list of upskirt and 
voyeurism Web sites.”26 This statement foreshadowed a typical 
instance of alleged upskirt voyeurism with regard to which 
criminal charges were filed in December 2004 in Washington 
State.27 In that case, a man allegedly used “a cellular telephone 
camera to attempt to take pictures up a 16-year-old girl’s skirt 
while she stood in a grocery checkout line.”28 According to police 
accounts, the suspect, Patrick Donald Armour, 
knelt down behind the girl, ostensibly to reach for a candy 
bar on a bottom shelf, and held a camera-equipped cellular 
phone under the girl’s skirt. A woman standing in the 
checkout line ahead of the girl said she looked back and 
saw Armour place his camera-phone under the girl’s skirt 
twice.29 
Sadly, the incident is not rare. On the other side of the country, 
in Florida, a man faced criminal charges in July 2004 for allegedly 
“using his camera phone to snap a picture underneath a 14-year-old 
girl’s skirt.”30 That incident took place in a mall—a public place 
where, traditionally, one has no reasonable expectation of 
privacy—as did an incident in Texas in 2004, in which police 
                                                          
25 See Pui-Wing Tam, Entreaty to Camera-Phone Photographers: Please 
Print, WALL ST. J., Dec. 28, 2004, at B1 (writing that “[s]ales of camera phones 
outstripped stand-alone digital cameras for the first time in 2003. This year, 
research firm IDC expects 186.3 million camera phones to be sold, more than 
double its projected 68.8 million for digital camera sales”). 
26 Meena Thiruvengadam, Privacy Issues; The Popularity of Camera 
Phones Raises Concerns About Voyeurism and the Right to Take Photos in 
Public Places, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Aug. 4, 2004, at 1E. 
27 John Craig, Up-Skirt Voyeurism Alleged; Newport Man Faces Charge in 
Checkout Line Incident, SPOKESMAN REV. (Spokane, Wash.), Dec. 19, 2004, at 
B1. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Virginian Charged in Florida with Voyeurism Using Camera Phone, 
ASSOC. PRESS STATE & LOCAL WIRE, July 10, 2004. 
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“arrested a 28-year-old Houston electrician using a digital camera 
to film images under the skirts of girls as young as 10 at a 
Woodlands Mall department store.”31 Such cases are more difficult 
and troubling from a legal perspective than those that take place in 
bathrooms and changing rooms, where victims have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, and thus, redress is possible.32 
But shortly before Christmas in 2004, President George W. 
Bush signed into law Senate Bill 1301, a measure designed to 
punish and deter such upskirt voyeurism on federal property.33 The 
Video Voyeurism Prevention Act of 2004 provides in relevant 
part: 
Whoever, in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction 
of the United States, has the intent to capture an image of a 
private area of an individual without their consent, and 
knowingly does so under circumstances in which the 
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy, shall be 
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, 
or both.34 
More importantly, the new law radically changes the traditional 
legal tenet that a person does not possess a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in a public place. In particular, the Act defines the 
phrase “under circumstances in which that individual has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy” to include “circumstances in 
which a reasonable person would believe that a private area of the 
individual would not be visible to the public, regardless of whether 
that person is in a public or private place.”35 
                                                          
31 Charlie Bier, Digital Technology a Boon to Criminals, HOUS. CHRON., 
July 15, 2004, at This Week 1. 
32 While the focus of this part of the article is on voyeurism in public 
places, violations of privacy through the use of miniature cameras continued in 
2004 in more private places such as bathrooms. See, e.g., Michael A. Scarcella, 
Detectives Trying to ID Voyeur Victims, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB., Dec. 24, 
2004, at B1 (describing a case in Florida in which authorities allege that “[f]rom 
a bathroom ceiling at a local gymnastics studio, the video camera rolled as the 
teenage girls undressed”). 
33 S. 1301, 108th Cong. (2004) (enacted). 
34 18 U.S.C. § 1801 (2005). 
35 Id. (emphasis added). 
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It is the italicized portion of the Act cited above that breaks 
with the traditional policy by granting people privacy, at least 
when it comes to certain areas on their bodies,36 even if they are in 
public places. The phrase “public privacy” thus is no longer an 
oxymoron. In adopting a new policy of what might be considered 
bodily privacy in public places, Congress has essentially borrowed 
the reasoning of both the drafters of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts from a quarter-century ago and the Alabama Supreme Court 
in Daily Times Democrat v. Graham37 four decades past. In 
particular, a comment by the drafters of the Restatement provides 
that “even in a public place . . . there may be some matters about 
the plaintiff, such as his underwear or lack of it, that are not 
exhibited to the public gaze; and there still may be an invasion of 
privacy when there is intrusion upon these matters.”38 Similarly, in 
Daily Times Democrat, the Alabama high court ruled in favor of a 
woman, Flora Bell Graham, who was photographed in public 
outside of an amusement fun house as air jets blew up her skirt, 
exposing her “from the waist down, with the exception of that 
portion covered by her ‘panties.’”39 In protecting Graham, the 
court wrote: 
Where the status he [the plaintiff] expects to occupy is 
changed without his volition to a status that is embarrassing 
to an ordinary person of reasonable sensitivity, then he 
should not be deemed to have forfeited his right to be 
protected from an indecent and vulgar intrusion of his right 
to privacy merely because misfortune overtakes him in a 
public place.40 
The Video Voyeurism Prevention Act of 2004 in essence 
recognizes the “misfortune” that overtakes the victims of high-tech 
Peeping Toms in public places and the related embarrassment and 
                                                          
36 The Video Voyeurism Prevention Act defines the protected private areas 
of the body to include “the naked or undergarment clad genitals, pubic area, 
buttocks, or female breast of that individual.” Id. 
37 162 So. 2d 474 (Ala. 1964). 
38 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. c (1977) (emphasis 
added). 
39 Daily Times Democrat, 162 So. 2d at 476. 
40 Id. at 478. 
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harm that ensues from such intrusions. But how might the new law 
impact journalists and their use of hidden cameras in investigative 
reports when they approach people in public places? The 
journalistic use of hidden cameras in public places, after all, is not 
an uncommon target of invasion of privacy lawsuits.41 
On its face, the Video Voyeurism Prevention Act of 2004 
should have little or no effect on journalists who use hidden 
cameras in public places. Why? Because the new law does not 
forbid all uses of hidden cameras in public places, but only their 
use to film or record “a private area of an individual without their 
consent.”42 Broadcast journalists who use hidden cameras would 
rarely try to capture images of the private area of a person; rather, 
they would more likely attempt to capture images of deceit, graft, 
and other wrongdoings by individuals or corporations in line with 
the roles described in this article’s introduction.43 As Kevin M. 
Goldberg, an attorney for the American Society of Newspaper 
Editors, stated, “Theoretically, you never want to see a criminal 
penalty imposed upon speech, but practically I believe this will 
have little effect on the mainstream media.”44 
The real risk for journalism, however, lies in the danger that 
the new statute’s recognition of a privacy right in a public place 
will be expanded by future legislation to apply to scenarios and 
situations beyond those of upskirt voyeurism. If federal law now 
officially recognizes a right to bodily privacy in crowded public 
                                                          
41 See, e.g., Deteresa v. ABC, 121 F.3d 460 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 
523 U.S. 1137 (1998) (involving several privacy-based causes of action for, 
among other things, the use of a hidden video camera by an ABC employee to 
videotape an individual, Beverly Deteresa, without her knowledge from a public 
street as she stood on the doorstep of her condominium); Wilkins v. NBC, 84 
Cal. Rptr. 329 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (involving an unsuccessful claim for 
intrusion into seclusion based upon the hidden camera videotaping by producers 
for NBC’s investigative newsmagazine, Dateline, at an outdoor patio table at a 
crowded public restaurant in Malibu, California). 
42 18 U.S.C. § 1801(a) (2005). 
43 See supra notes 2-4 (describing the aspirational roles and goals of the 
press). 
44 Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Congress Approves 
Criminal “Video Voyeurism” Law, available at http://www.rcfp.org/news/ 
2004/0923s1301b.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2004). 
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places such as malls, then what is to prevent it in the future from 
recognizing conversational privacy in crowded public places? 
People have intimate conversations in public places, after all, that 
they may not believe others can hear. 
What is more, groups such as the American Civil Liberties 
Union (ACLU) already claim that the current use in several major 
cities of security cameras that capture images of people’s faces in 
outdoor public spaces violates individual privacy rights.45 In other 
words, the Video Voyeurism Prevention Act of 2004 may have 
opened the floodgates for the expansion of other privacy interests 
in public places. In turn, it may affect the use of surveillance 
cameras outdoors in public places.46 Whether this ultimately 
occurs, however, remains to be seen. In the meantime, the new law 
and its expansion of privacy rights to public places should have no 
impact on the work of professional journalists and their camera 
people. 
                                                          
45 See Mark F. Bonner, Parish Gets Money for Street Cameras; ACLU’s 
Concerns Fail to Dissuade Sheriff, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), July 24, 
2004, at 1 (writing that a plan to install surveillance cameras in an area near 
New Orleans, Louisiana, has “drawn opposition from the American Civil 
Liberties Union,” and quoting Joe Cook, executive director of the ACLU in 
Louisiana, for the proposition that the cameras constitute a “reckless gamble of 
privacy rights that wastes tax dollars”); Doug Donovan, Camera System 
Expands in City, BALT. SUN, Dec. 2, 2004, at 1B (describing the objections of 
the ACLU to a network of 24-hour surveillance cameras in the Inner Harbor 
district of Baltimore, Maryland, and stating that the “American Civil Liberties 
Union opposes the Baltimore network, saying the camera system infringes on 
privacy rights and are [sic] ineffective in fighting crime or terrorism”); Jessica 
Garrison, Cameras to Keep Watch in Hollywood, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2004, at 
A1 (citing the objections of the American Civil Liberties Union to the 
installation of surveillance cameras on public city streets by the Los Angeles 
Police Department, and quoting Ramona Ripston, executive director of the 
American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California, for the proposition that 
“[t]his is creeping Big Brotherism, and it’s really disturbing. More and more, we 
are losing our right to any kind of privacy”). 
46 Surveillance cameras “have come under fire from the American Civil 
Liberties Union, which in recent years has campaigned against them in several 
cities. The organization has cited a range of objections, from skepticism about 
the cameras’ ability to produce results to possible privacy violations.” Frank 
Donze, Crime-Time Program, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Jan. 14, 2005, 
at 1 (emphasis added). 
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II. EXTENDING STATUTORY PRIVACY RIGHTS TO RELATIVES OF THE 
DEAD: THE LASTING LEGACY OF VINCENT FOSTER 
While the Video Voyeurism Prevention Act of 2004 created a 
new federal statutory privacy right and policy with regard to 
certain images of people captured in public places, the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in National Archives and Records 
Administration v. Favish47 stretched and expanded an existing 
federal statutory right of “personal privacy”48 to apply to a 
“decedent’s family when the family objects to the release of 
photographs showing the condition of the body at the scene of 
death.”49 In brief, the case transformed a right of personal privacy 
into a familial or relational privacy right, at least in relation to 
death-scene photographs. As an editorial in the Plain Dealer in 
Cleveland, Ohio, argued, “The high court effectively ripped out of 
the Freedom of Information Act a great chunk of the public’s right 
to know what its government is doing in its name.”50 The 
implications for journalists of the Favish opinion, as this part of the 
article argues, are both serious and far reaching. To understand 
those implications, it is first necessary to understand the facts and 
issues of the case. 
The case centered on the efforts of Allan Favish, a California 
attorney, to obtain government-taken, death-scene photographs of 
Vincent Foster, Jr., former deputy counsel to President Clinton.51 
Although numerous government investigations concluded that the 
shooting of Foster was a suicide, Favish doubted their findings, 
and he thus made a request for the photographs under the federal 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in order to determine for 
himself what might have really happened.52 Under FOIA, any 
person may request copies of records from a federal government 
                                                          
47 541 U.S. 157 (2004). 
48 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (2005). 
49 Favish, 541 U.S. at 160. 
50 A Feel-Bad Ruling; Supreme Court’s Emotions Get in the Way of Its 
Judgment in Vince Foster Case, and the Public’s Rights Suffer, PLAIN DEALER 
(Cleveland, Ohio), Apr. 3, 2004, at B8. 
51 Favish, 541 U.S. at 160-61. 
52 Id. at 161. 
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agency and the agency must supply it unless the information falls 
within one of nine statutorily defined exempt areas.53 In this case, 
the government agencies that held the Foster photographs at one 
time or another included: 1) the National Park Service, as U.S. 
Park Police had taken the photographs of Foster; 2) the Office of 
Independent Counsel (OIC), which, under both Robert Fiske and 
Kenneth Starr, had investigated Foster’s death and concluded it 
was a suicide; and 3) the National Archives and Records 
Administration, which took possession of the photographs at the 
conclusion of the OIC’s investigation.54 
Foster’s immediate relatives, however, objected to Favish’s 
request for the death-scene photographs, asserting, as the Supreme 
Court noted, “their own refuge from a sensation-seeking culture for 
their own peace of mind and tranquility.”55 Specifically, Sheila 
Foster Anthony, sister of Vincent Foster, wrote in an affidavit that 
the release of the death-scene images of her late brother “would 
constitute a painful unwarranted invasion of my privacy, my 
mother’s privacy, my sister’s privacy, and the privacy of Lisa 
Foster Moody (Vince’s widow), her three children, and other 
members of the Foster family.”56 
Foster’s relatives asserted that Exemption 7(C) of FOIA 
prevented the release of the photographs. This exemption prevents 
and shields the disclosure of records or information compiled for a 
law enforcement purpose that “could reasonably be expected to 
constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”57 The 
battle in the U.S. Supreme Court hinged initially on the meaning of 
the term “personal privacy,” with Favish emphasizing the 
importance of the word “personal” and asserting that the term 
should be narrowly construed to mean “the right to control 
information about oneself.”58 The self in this case was Foster, and, 
so went the argument of Favish, since Foster was dead, he could 
                                                          
53 MARC A. FRANKLIN ET AL., MASS MEDIA LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 
670 (6th ed. 2000). 
54 Favish, 541 U.S. at 160-64. 
55 Id. at 166. 
56 Id. at 167. 
57 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (1995). 
58 Favish, 541 U.S. at 165. 
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not assert his own privacy interest.59 Stated differently, Favish 
contended that “the individual who is the subject of the 
information is the only one with a privacy interest.”60 
Foster’s immediate relatives, however, asked the nation’s high 
court to adopt a much broader construction of the term “personal 
privacy” that would include the decedent family’s privacy 
interests.61 The Supreme Court sided with the Foster family, 
adopting an expansive interpretation of personal privacy and 
noting that “the statutory privacy right protected by Exemption 
7(C) goes beyond the common law and the Constitution.”62 Citing 
a very odd mix of authorities in support of its conclusion—the 
Encyclopaedia Britannica and a Greek drama by Sophocles, 
among others—Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote for a unanimous 
Court that “[f]amily members have a personal stake in honoring 
and mourning their dead and objecting to unwarranted public 
exploitation that, by intruding upon their own grief, tends to 
degrade the rites and respect they seek to accord to the deceased 
person who was once their own.”63 Kennedy added that the Court 
had “little difficulty . . . in finding in our case law and traditions 
the right of family members to direct and control disposition of the 
body of the deceased and to limit attempts to exploit pictures of the 
deceased family member’s remains for public purposes.”64 He 
noted that the “well-established cultural tradition acknowledging a 
family’s control over the body and death images of the deceased 
has long been recognized at common law.”65 
In expanding the term “personal privacy” to sweep in family 
members of the deceased and in refusing to limit the term to 
individuals who are the subjects of the information or images in 
question, the Supreme Court also invoked a parade-of-horrors 
argument. In particular, it attempted to demonstrate the evils that 
might result if it ruled against Vincent Foster’s family: 
                                                          
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 166-67. 
62 Id. at 170. 
63 Favish, 541 U.S. at 168. 
64 Id. at 167. 
65 Id. at 168. 
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We are advised by the Government that child molesters, 
rapists, murderers, and other violent criminals often make 
FOIA requests for autopsies, photographs, and records of 
their deceased victims. Our holding ensures that the privacy 
interests of surviving family members would allow the 
Government to deny these gruesome requests in 
appropriate cases. We find it inconceivable that Congress 
could have intended a definition of “personal privacy” so 
narrow that it would allow convicted felons to obtain these 
materials without limitations at the expense of surviving 
family members’ personal privacy.66 
If this is correct, then how could the Court’s finding possibly 
harm the practice of journalism? Because the holding makes it 
clear that the familial right of privacy outweighs the public’s 
unenumerated First Amendment right to know, at least when 
images of the dead are involved. 
The Court’s logic has immediate implications for press 
coverage of the ongoing war in Iraq, particularly with regard to 
photographs of caskets of dead soldiers as they are flown home 
and arrive in the United States. Images of dead American soldiers, 
gruesome though they may be for some, are important for the 
public to see because they bring home the reality of war; put more 
bluntly, media images depicting the loss of life, through their 
power to galvanize public opinion against a war, may save lives in 
the future. But the reasoning of the Court in Favish would suggest 
that the privacy rights of families would prevent the public from 
viewing these images. Thus, if the Court’s privacy calculus is 
extended beyond the reaches of FOIA Exemption 7(C), the Favish 
opinion does not bode well for journalists who seek access to 
information and images related to the human costs of war; in fact, 
it is perilous precedent. 
These issues and implications are far more than speculative. As 
journalist Hal Bernton wrote in December 2004, it was the 
publication of a photograph of flag-draped coffins carrying dead 
American soldiers, lined up in the fuselage of an airplane, that 
“rekindled debate about a Pentagon policy—sometimes waived in 
                                                          
66 Id. at 170. 
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years past but enforced by the Bush administration—to ban media 
coverage of transport of military coffins.”67 The logic in Favish, 
however, supports and bolsters the U.S. Department of Defense’s 
thirteen-year-old policy that “has banned photographs and videos 
that show the flag-draped coffins of American soldiers”68 as they 
arrive at Dover Air Force Base in Delaware. In June 2004, the U.S. 
Senate defeated by a 54-to-39 vote a bill that would have permitted 
news photographers access to Dover Air Force Base.69 While the 
ban ostensibly is designed to protect the privacy interests of the 
families of the deceased soldiers,70 it has been described by at least 
one critic, The New York Times’s Maureen Dowd, as “the 
Pentagon’s self-serving ban.”71 
The immediate implications of Favish, which took place within 
the context of a FOIA case, may well come to bear on a new 
FOIA-based lawsuit, filed in late 2004, that “seeks to force the 
Pentagon to release photographs and videotape of coffins of 
service members killed overseas and brought back to the United 
States.”72 As Meredith Fuchs, one of the attorneys involved in that 
suit told a reporter, “These are the kind of documents that directly 
serve the core purpose of FOIA. . . . Everyone says a picture is 
worth a thousand words. Well, the pictures have an impact and 
help people understand what war is really about in a way that 
nothing else does.”73 The question now is whether the privacy 
interests of the relatives of the deceased will trump the public’s 
right to know, as served by journalists. Unfortunately, the 
                                                          
67 Hal Bernton, Reflecting on an Image Taken, a Choice Made, a Life 
Altered, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 26, 2004, at A1. 
68 Frank Harris III, America’s War Dead Should Be Shown, HARTFORD 
COURANT, Oct. 11, 2004, at A11. 
69 Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Senate Backs Ban on Photos of G.I. Coffins, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 22, 2004, at A17. 
70 See id. (writing that “President Bush has insisted that the policy banning 
the photography protects the privacy of the families of the dead”). 
71 Maureen Dowd, Wolfie’s Fuzzy Math, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2004, at 
Section 4, 11. 
72 George Edmonson, Suit Seeks Military Coffin Photos, ATLANTA J.-
CONST., Oct. 5, 2004, at A7. 
73 Id. 
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reasoning adopted by the Supreme Court in Favish militates 
against the latter interest. 
The decision in Favish also is troubling to journalists for a 
second reason—a reason beyond its expansive interpretation of the 
term “personal privacy.” As the Christian Science Monitor noted, 
“The decision makes it more difficult for media organizations, 
government watchdog groups, and historians to obtain certain 
types of documents held in government files.”74 Specifically, the 
decision creates evidentiary barriers and hurdles for reporters 
requesting information under FOIA whenever Exemption 7(C) is 
raised to block the release of that information. The Court in Favish 
abrogated what it called “the usual rule that the citizen need not 
offer a reason for requesting the information”75 and instead held 
that 
the person requesting the information [must] establish a 
sufficient reason for the disclosure. First, the citizen must 
show that the public interest sought to be advanced is a 
significant one, an interest more specific than having the 
information for its own sake. Second, the citizen must show 
the information is likely to advance that interest. Otherwise, 
the invasion of privacy is unwarranted.76 
This two-step test, it should be noted, somewhat mirrors two 
aspects of the Supreme Court’s four-part commercial speech 
doctrine, created in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. Public 
Service Commission.77 In particular, that doctrine requires the 
government to prove that it has a “substantial” interest before it 
can restrict truthful advertising for lawful products and that this 
interest is directly advanced by the regulation.78 What is different, 
of course, is that the Central Hudson test imposes a burden on the 
government before it can restrict speech, while the Favish test, 
conversely, imposes a burden on private individuals, such as 
                                                          
74 Warren Richey, In Vincent Foster Case, Court Upholds Privacy, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 31, 2004, at 3. 
75 541 U.S. 157, 172 (2004). 
76 Id. 
77 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). 
78 Id. at 564. 
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journalists and members of the public at large, before they can 
obtain speech. 
Favish, it should be stressed, sought the death-scene 
photographs not because he harbored some prurient interest or 
deviant desire in them, but rather because he doubted the 
credibility and accuracy of multiple government investigations into 
the death of a person, Vincent Foster, who was very closely 
connected with the highest ranking government official in the 
country, then-President of the United States Bill Clinton. The 
Court held that in such instances in which “the public interest 
being asserted is to show that responsible officials acted 
negligently or otherwise improperly in the performance of their 
duties,” the requester of information first “must produce evidence 
that would warrant a belief by a reasonable person that the alleged 
Government impropriety might have occurred.”79 
The problem with this from a requester’s perspective is that the 
photographs or information being sought might be either the only 
type of physical evidence that exists or the most important piece 
available. As Lucy Dalglish, head of the Reporters Committee for 
Freedom of the Press, remarked, “I don’t know how you can 
expect requesters to prove a negative before they are entitled to a 
record under the Freedom of Information Act.”80 Favish, the high 
court ultimately concluded, had not met this burden; in fact, he had 
“not produced any evidence that would warrant a belief by a 
reasonable person that the alleged Government impropriety might 
have occurred.”81 
The Supreme Court’s requirement that courts must engage in 
“a meaningful evidentiary showing”82 when FOIA exemption 7(C) 
privacy concerns are raised, with the burden being placed squarely 
on the requester of information, clearly elevates privacy interests 
above free speech interests, including the public’s right to know. 
The decision thus represents a judicial blow, struck in the name of 
relational or familial privacy, against journalists’—and, by 
                                                          
79 Favish, 541 U.S. at 173. 
80 Linda Greenhouse, Justices Unanimously Bar Release of Photos From 
the Suicide of a Top Clinton Aide, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2004, at A16. 
81 Favish, 541 U.S. at 175. 
82 Id. 
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extension, the public’s—access to government records. Although 
“Favish may be a helpful precedent for persons seeking privacy 
protection from an intrusive media,”83 it is decidedly damaging to 
a democratic society when applied to journalistic intrusions related 
to the reporting of alleged misconduct by public officials. Thus, 
while it may be possible for some simply to dismiss Favish as just 
another conspiracy theorist, one cannot so easily dismiss the 
speech-related implications of the case and precedent that now 
bear his name. 
 This part of the article has demonstrated how one type of 
privacy concern trumped access to government-held information in 
2004. One question raised by this outcome is whether the case 
reveals the judiciary’s implicit assumptions about what constitutes 
worthy impositions on, in contrast to unworthy prying into, 
individual privacy. Two additional cases from 2004, involving 
high-profile celebrities from the worlds of music and sports, 
implicate this question, similarly placing the concept of privacy 
squarely in the balance. The next part of this article examines these 
two cases—one centering on Michael Jackson, and the other, on 
Kobe Bryant—in which the privacy interests of two high-profile 
celebrities outweighed, as they did in Favish, the First Amendment 
interest in the right to receive and publish information about 
matters of public interest. 
III. PRIVACY AND SEXUAL ASSAULT CASES: JOURNALISTIC LOSSES 
IN THE KOBE BRYANT & MICHAEL JACKSON CASES 
When jury selection finally began in February 2005 in the 
sexual molestation case against Michael Jackson, the news and 
entertainment media were out in full force, with cameras and boom 
microphones at the ready, to capture and cover every courtroom 
entrance and exit by the so-called King of Pop. For journalists, the 
opportunity to witness the trial’s daily happenings, even in such a 
circus-like atmosphere, was a welcome relief from the excessive 
secrecy that had cloaked the case in 2004. 
                                                          
83 Ronald J. Riccio, Subjecting War to the Law, 177 N.J.L.J. 321 (July 26, 
2004). 
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Laurie Levenson, a professor at Loyola Law School in Los 
Angeles and frequent media commentator,84 summed up the 
massive sealing of documents in the case against Jackson, 
remarking, “I’ve never seen a case with this level of secrecy. 
You’d think we were dealing with the Pentagon Papers. Everyone 
is filing papers in code and we’re on the eve of trial.”85 Her 
sentiment was echoed by Dalglish, who wrote in a Sacramento 
Bee-published commentary that the “Michael Jackson prosecution 
has been conducted under a cloak of secrecy. Unbelievably, the 
judge in the Jackson case has refused to even release the 
indictment against the entertainer.”86 Beyond that, as another 
newspaper observed, the “[l]awyers and investigators on all sides 
of the case are barred from speaking to the media.”87 
In the Michael Jackson case, which centers on ten different 
felony counts related to the singer’s alleged molestation of a 13-
year-old leukemia patient in 2003 at his secluded ranch in Southern 
California,88 Judge Rodney Melville justified the need for massive 
privacy and the denial of the public’s right to know by citing the 
singer’s constitutional right to a fair trial.89 As Melville remarked 
in June 2004 in rejecting a motion to lift orders sealing records in 
the case, “The court is trying to balance the First Amendment right 
against the right to a fair trial. This defendant is known around the 
                                                          
84 Levenson, a former prosecutor, also is the William M. Rains Fellow and 
Director of Loyola Law School’s Center for Ethical Advocacy. Loyola Law 
School Web site, available at http://www.lls.edu/academics/faculty/ 
levenson.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2005). 
85 Linda Deutsch, Court Rulings Continue to Shield Evidence in Michael 
Jackson Case, ASSOC. PRESS NEWSWIRES, Jan. 4, 2005. 
86 Lucy Dalglish, Courts Undermine Freedom of the Press, SACRAMENTO 
BEE, Aug. 22, 2004, at E3. 
87 John M. Broder, From Grand Jury Leaks Comes a Clash of Rights, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 15, 2005, at A8. 
88 See generally Eric Slater & Steve Chawkins, Opening Statements in 
Jackson Trial Today, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2005, at B1. 
89 See generally Martin Kasindorf, New Set of Charges Awaits Jackson, 
USA TODAY, Apr. 30, 2004, at A3 (writing that “Melville, citing the perils to a 
fair trial that publicity could pose, has sealed document after document in the 
case”). 
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world and that makes it very difficult to get a fair trial.”90 The right 
to a fair trial is codified in the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution, which provides in relevant part that “[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein 
the crime shall have been committed . . . .”91 
The Jackson case was not the only celebrity criminal trial in 
2004, however, in which privacy interests trumped the public’s 
right to know. Even more significantly, in July 2004, the Supreme 
Court of Colorado upheld a prior restraint on publication against 
seven media entities that had lawfully obtained accurate 
information about the sexual conduct and history of the woman 
who accused Los Angeles Laker Kobe Bryant of sexual assault.92 
What is critical here is that while the Colorado high court 
acknowledged that a “[p]rior restraint of publication is an 
extraordinary remedy attended by a heavy presumption against its 
constitutional validity,”93 it nonetheless concluded that the privacy 
interests of the accuser, as protected by a state rape shield statute, 
were sufficient to overcome this presumption and the First 
Amendment interests of a free press and the public’s right to 
know.94 The editors of the Denver Post opined in an editorial that 
the Colorado Supreme Court’s decision was “an impermissible 
encroachment on the First Amendment. It was an effort to balance 
First Amendment and privacy concerns, a delicate task. But the 
decision was one of flawed logic that would set a bad precedent.”95 
In referencing the decision’s impact on the press, University of 
Colorado Law Professor Paul Campos stated, “We’re not talking 
                                                          
90 Michelle Caruso, Jax Case Secrets to Stay Off-Limits, DAILY NEWS 
(N.Y.), June 26, 2004, at 6. 
91 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment is also applicable to the 
states by incorporation. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
92 People v. Bryant, 94 P.3d 624 (Colo. 2004), stay denied, 125 S. Ct. 1 
(2004). 
93 Id. at 628. 
94 Id. at 628-32. 
95 Editorial, State Court Trying to Rewrite Constitution, DENVER POST, July 
21, 2004, at B-06. 
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about a chilling effect, we’re talking about a freezing effect.”96 
While the criminal case against Bryant eventually was dropped,97 
the prior restraint precedent in Colorado remains on the books. It 
thus is important to understand what happened in that case and 
how privacy triumphed over journalists’ ability to report truthful 
news of public interest. 
The complex prior restraint issues in the criminal case against 
Kobe Bryant all began because of simple human errors and the 
push of a button on a computer. In particular, a court reporter 
mistakenly emailed to seven news organizations transcripts of an 
in camera pretrial proceeding conducted by the trial court judge to 
determine the relevancy, if any, of the prior or subsequent sexual 
conduct of the woman who accused Bryant of rape.98 The notation 
“IN CAMERA PROCEEDINGS” was marked on every page of 
the transcripts, which were mistakenly sent out over the Internet 
“because the court reporter maintained an electronic list for media 
entities subscribing to transcripts of the public proceedings in the 
case.”99 The news organizations thus became the fortunate 
recipients of accurate information that would either confirm or 
deny rumors about the complaining witness’s sexual history that 
had circulated in the court of public opinion and on the World 
Wide Web. 
When the error was called to the attention of trial court judge 
Terry Ruckriegle, however, he “ordered the recipients to delete or 
destroy their copies and prohibited them from reporting the 
contents.”100 The order was immediately appealed directly to the 
Colorado Supreme Court by the media outlets on the grounds that 
it constituted an unconstitutional prior restraint.101 The order at 
issue before the high court of Colorado provided: 
                                                          
96 Jeff Kass, Case Sparks Debate About Key Principles, ROCKY MTN. 
NEWS (Denver), Aug. 26, 2004, at 8K. 
97 Kirk Johnson, As Accuser Balks, Prosecutors Drop Bryant Rape Case, 
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98 People v. Bryant, 94 P.3d 624, 626 (Colo. 2004). 
99 Id. at 627. 
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It has come to the Court’s attention that the in camera 
portions of the hearings in this matter on the 21st and 22nd 
were erroneously distributed. These transcripts are not for 
public dissemination. Anyone who has received these 
transcripts is ordered to delete and destroy any copies and 
not reveal any contents thereof, or be subject to contempt 
of Court.102 
The Colorado Supreme Court was forced to weigh the privacy 
interests of Bryant’s accuser against the First Amendment interests 
of a free press. The precedent in support of the news media was 
clear. The U.S. Supreme Court held a quarter-century ago that “if a 
newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of 
public significance then state officials may not constitutionally 
punish publication of the information, absent a need to further a 
state interest of the highest order.”103 It was a rule the Court 
affirmed and applied as recently as 2001.104 As applied in the 
Bryant situation, the news media had lawfully obtained the truthful 
transcripts about a matter of clear public concern that had attracted 
massive media attention. 
Weighed against this precedent, however, was the interest “in 
providing a confidential evidentiary proceeding under the rape 
shield statute, because such hearings protect victims’ privacy, 
encourage victims to report sexual assault, and further the 
prosecution and deterrence of sexual assault.”105 Under Colorado’s 
rape shield statute, the prior or subsequent sexual conduct of an 
alleged sexual assault victim is presumed to be irrelevant unless 
the judge determines that one of several specified exceptions 
applies.106 Although the trial court judge in Bryant’s case 
ultimately found that the accuser’s sexual conduct during a 
seventy-two-hour period prior to her medical examination at a 
hospital after the alleged assault by Bryant was relevant and 
                                                          
102 Bryant, 94 P.3d at 626. 
103 Smith v. Daily Mail, 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979). 
104 See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 527-28 (2001) (noting how the 
court has “repeatedly held” this rule). 
105 Bryant, 94 P.3d at 626. 
106 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-131 (2004). 
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admissible,107 the transcript of the in camera hearing on the issue 
remained sealed. 
To weigh the competing interests and to determine the 
constitutionality of the trial judge’s prior restraint order, a majority 
of the Colorado Supreme Court fashioned a three-part test that 
asked whether: 
1. the state of Colorado had an interest of the highest order 
that would justify a prior restraint; 
2. the restraint was the narrowest available remedy to 
protect the alleged interest of the highest order; and 
3. the prior restraint was “necessary to protect against an 
evil that is great and certain, would result from the 
reportage, and cannot be mitigated by less intrusive 
measures.”108 
In a 4-3 decision, a majority of the Colorado Supreme Court on 
July 19, 2004 applied this three-pronged approach and upheld that 
part of the trial court’s order that prevented the media from 
revealing the contents of the sealed documents, emphasizing that 
the state’s interests of “the highest order in this case not only 
involve the victim’s privacy interest, but also the reporting and 
prosecution of this and other sexual assault cases.”109 The majority 
reasoned that “the harms in making these in camera judicial 
proceedings public would be great, certain, and devastating to the 
victim and to the state. These harms justify the remedy we fashion 
in this case.”110 To assure that the order was as narrow as possible, 
                                                          
107 See Kirk Johnson, Judge Limiting Sex-Life Shield at Bryant Trial, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 24, 2004, at A1. 
[T]he judge ruled that the defense could introduce direct or 
circumstantial evidence about any sexual conduct on the woman’s part 
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108 Bryant, 94 P.3d at 628. 
109 Id. at 636. 
110 Id. at 637. 
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the majority struck down that portion of Judge Ruckriegle’s order 
requiring the media to delete or destroy the documents it had 
received, and it noted that “[p]ublication of information the media 
has obtained or obtains by its own investigative capacities is not 
limited by the District Court’s order or our judgment, even though 
such information may also be spoken of or referred to in the 
transcripts.”111 
Three members of Colorado’s high court signed off on a 
vigorous dissent, written by Justice Michael Bender, contending 
that 
two striking facts about this case make it obvious that the 
prior restraint issued by the district court is an 
unconstitutional violation of the freedom of the press 
guaranteed by the First Amendment. First, most of the 
private details of the alleged victim’s sexual conduct 
around the time of the alleged rape, which is also the 
subject matter of the confidential hearings in this case, are 
already available through public court documents and other 
sources and have been widely reported by the media. 
Second, the media did nothing wrong in obtaining the 
transcripts. Under well-established prior restraint doctrine, 
these two factors alone require this Court to direct the 
district court to vacate its order immediately.112 
The dissent’s passionate argument, however, failed to carry the 
day in court, and the majority allowed the prior restraint to remain 
in place. The decision shocked First Amendment scholars such as 
Erwin Chemerinsky, who remarked, “This is a court order 
prohibiting publication. Unless the Supreme Court dramatically 
changes the law of the First Amendment, this decision can’t 
stand.”113 
But, unfortunately for free press advocates, it did. Although the 
media quickly asked the U.S. Supreme Court to step in to prevent 
the enforcement of the prior restraint, the nation’s high court 
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112 Id. at 639 (Bender, J., dissenting). 
113 Steve Henson & Henry Weinstein, Court Bars Disclosure by Media, 
L.A. TIMES, July 20, 2004, at D1. 
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refused to stay the order, in part because of timing issues.114 Justice 
Stephen Breyer wrote that 
the trial court’s determination as to the relevancy of the 
rape shield material will significantly change the 
circumstances that have led to this application [for a stay of 
the prior restraint]. As a result of that determination, the 
trial court may decide to release the transcripts at issue here 
in their entirety, or to release some portions while redacting 
others. Their release . . . is imminent.115 
In essence, the Supreme Court passed on the issue, but strongly 
suggested that the trial court judge quickly review and release as 
much of the transcripts, redacted if necessary, as possible. Justice 
Breyer also wrote that the news organizations could re-file in two 
days’ time for a stay with the U.S. Supreme Court if the trial court 
judge had not, by that time, made his findings regarding which 
portions of the transcripts could be released.116 In response to 
Breyer’s rather forceful encouragement, Judge Ruckriegle ordered 
the prosecution and defense “to work together to produce an edited 
version of disputed transcripts that can be released to the 
public.”117 
The media entities involved ultimately dropped a second 
appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court in August 2004 after the trial 
judge unsealed large portions of the transcripts of the closed-door 
hearings about the sexual history of Bryant’s accuser.118 One 
reason the appeal was dropped, however, was to avoid “the 
possibility that the U.S. Supreme Court might uphold Colorado’s 
high court, setting a national precedent in favor of do-not-publish 
orders.”119 Thus, while the transcripts were made public in the 
Bryant case, “the greater battle over prior restraints remains.”120 
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115 Id. at 2. 
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117 Steve Henson, Judge Seeks Edits of Transcripts, L.A. TIMES, July 28, 
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In summary, in 2004, when it came to sexual assault cases 
involving high-profile public figures such as Kobe Bryant and 
Michael Jackson, privacy and secrecy trumped the public’s right to 
know and the First Amendment interest in a free press. This does 
not bode well for the press in 2005 and beyond. As media reporter 
Tim Rutten observed in the Los Angeles Times, “[T]he precedent 
established in the Bryant case ominously stands in Colorado.”121 
Why are trial court judges such as Terry Ruckriegle and 
Rodney Melville now coming down squarely on the side of privacy 
and against the First Amendment interests of the public and 
journalists? Could there be factors at play here besides legal rules 
and principles (such as the right to a fair trial and rape shield 
statutes) that might be influencing their opinions?122 One 
extrajudicial, contextual variable that might be playing an unseen 
role is a possible growing sentiment that the prying and peering 
behavior of the news media that has, in part, given rise to our 
voyeuristic culture has simply gone too far.123 In fact, Michael 
Jackson’s attorneys, in arguing for certain information to be kept 
sealed, wrote that media coverage of the case was “voyeuristic and 
entertainment-related”124 and that the press was simply seeking 
                                                          
POST, Aug. 4, 2004, at B-02. 
121 Tim Rutten, Regarding Media; Secrecy Proves Costly, L.A. TIMES, 
Sept. 3, 2004, at E1. 
122 The law often is influenced by variables that may have nothing to do 
with legal rules. Benjamin N. Cardozo, the late U.S. Supreme Court Justice, 
wrote more than eighty years ago that the forces that influence judges in their 
opinions 
are seldom fully in consciousness. They lie so near the surface, 
however, that their existence and influence are not likely to be 
disclaimed. . . . Deep below consciousness are other forces, the likes 
and dislikes, the predilections and prejudices, the complex of instincts 
and emotions and habits and convictions, which make the man, whether 
he be litigant or judge. 
Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, in SELECTED 
WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO 178 (M.E. Hall ed., 1947). 
123 See generally CLAY CALVERT, VOYEUR NATION: MEDIA, PRIVACY, AND 
PEERING IN MODERN CULTURE 133-37 (2000) (detailing the media’s voyeuristic 
news practices and the public’s appetite for such content). 
124 Liptak, supra note 17, at A20. 
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“material that might sell magazines or provide higher ratings 
during sweeps week on television.”125 What the author of this 
article has elsewhere identified as the voyeurism value in First 
Amendment jurisprudence126 may finally have met its match in the 
form of celebrity cases involving sexual assault. 
Parsed differently, what occurred in 2004 may well represent 
the start of an unfortunate wave of judicial backlash in response to 
prior journalistic indiscretions or out of fear of future foibles. A 
recent article in the ABA Journal on celebrity cases and the sealing 
of records, including those involving Kobe Bryant and Michael 
Jackson, noted how some people “say increasing numbers of 
competing news organizations and the rise of tabloid journalism 
have overwhelmed courts and forced judges’ hands.”127 
Or could it be that the judges’ decisions against the news media 
reflect a much broader and pervasive lack of public trust in the 
news media?128 Put differently, if the public does not trust the news 
media, then why should Judge Melville—a member of that same 
public—trust news organizations with the sensitive sexual 
information at issue in the Michael Jackson case? After all, a 
survey conducted in 2004 on behalf of the Project for Excellence 
in Journalism found that the “public believes that news 
organizations are operating largely to make money, and that the 
journalists who work for these organizations are primarily 
motivated by professional ambition and self-interest.”129 It would 
be distressing for journalists, of course, to believe that they in part 
brought this situation on themselves, but that may be the case. 
Ultimately, regardless of the actual reasons, the Michael 
Jackson and Kobe Bryant cases in 2004 represent triumphs of 
privacy over a free press and the public’s right to know. The next 
                                                          
125 Steve Chawkins, Jackson Lawyers Scold Media for Seeking Records, 
L.A. TIMES, July 20, 2004, at B6. 
126 Clay Calvert, The Voyeurism Value in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 
17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 273 (1999). 
127 John Gibeaut, Celebrity Justice, ABA J., Jan. 2005, at 42, 47. 
128 Cf. Mark Jurkowitz, Public’s Cynicism About Media Has Become A 
Pressing Concern, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 14, 2004, at C1 (writing that “public 
distrust of the news media appears to be at a dangerously high level”). 
129 Id. 
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part of this article illustrates, using the opinion of another court in 
2004 in a decidedly non-celebrity setting, some of the specific, 
privacy-intrusive journalistic practices that may result in legal 
liability. Despite the different setting and players in this next case, 
privacy again prevailed in court. In contrast to the Jackson and 
Bryant cases, in which cameras were a pervasive presence outside 
of the public courthouses, the case discussed in the next part of the 
article poses ramifications for the covert use of cameras and 
microphones by journalists inside of private places. 
IV. UNDERCOVER JOURNALISM AND PRIVACY: SOME LESSONS 
FROM 20/20 IN 2004 
Los Angeles-based attorney Neville Johnson has made a name 
for himself as a litigator by suing news media organizations on 
behalf of people who claim that their privacy interests were 
invaded by duplicitous and invasive newsgathering techniques.130 
He successfully posited such an argument before the Supreme 
Court of California in Sanders v. American Broadcasting 
Companies, Inc.131 In that case, which examined the use of hidden 
cameras and microphones, Johnson coaxed from the court a 
decision holding that a plaintiff need not prove a complete 
expectation of privacy to recover under the tort of intrusion into 
seclusion.132 
In 2004, Johnson was at it once again, this time in federal 
court, in a case called Turnbull v. American Broadcasting 
Companies, Inc.133 The case pivoted on the surreptitious recording 
of both images and voices by an undercover ABC producer for a 
20/20 newsmagazine segment called “Pay to Play” that aired in 
November 2002. The lawsuit focused “on the alleged intrusion of 
                                                          
130 See generally Richards & Calvert, supra note 9 (profiling Johnson and 
providing the transcript of an in-depth, first-person interview with him). 
131 20 Cal. 4th 907 (1999). 
132 Id. at 916 (holding that “[t]here are degrees and nuances to societal 
recognition of our expectations of privacy: the fact that the privacy one expects 
in a given setting is not complete or absolute does not render the expectation 
unreasonable as a matter of law”). 
133 32 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2442 (C.D. Cal. 2004). 
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privacy rather than the broadcast of the program,”134 as the 
plaintiffs did not assert a cause of action for defamation.135 
In August 2004, U.S. District Court Judge S. James Otero 
issued an order rejecting ABC’s motion for summary judgment on 
a number of privacy-based causes of action filed by Johnson and 
his partner, Brian Rishwain, thus allowing much of the case to 
proceed to a jury trial.136 Although the plaintiffs ultimately lost at 
trial on October 28, 2004,137 there are several significant aspects of 
Judge Otero’s summary judgment ruling that bode well for privacy 
advocates and that may impact and limit future hidden-camera and 
hidden-microphone investigations by journalists. In particular, 
Judge Otero’s decision permitting causes of action based on 
eavesdropping,138 intrusion into seclusion,139 trespass,140 and 
                                                          
134 Id. at 2446. 
135 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 44 (Deering 2004) (defining defamation in 
California to include both libel and slander). 
136 Turnbull, 32 Media L. Rep. 2442 (C.D. Cal. 2004). 
137 See E-mail from Jim Ryan, associate attorney for Johnson & Rishwain, 
LLP, to Clay Calvert, Associate Professor of Communications and Law at The 
Pennsylvania State University (Jan. 18, 2005, 14:39:59 PST) (on file with 
author) (setting forth the date of the jury verdict, and noting that a motion for a 
new trial had been filed and was, at that time, under consideration). 
138 CAL. PENAL CODE § 632 (Deering 2004). This section, which applies to 
the secretive recording of confidential communications, provides in relevant 
part: 
Every person who, intentionally and without the consent of all parties 
to a confidential communication, by means of any electronic 
amplifying or recording device, eavesdrops upon or records the 
confidential communication, whether the communication is carried on 
among the parties in the presence of one another or by means of a 
telegraph, telephone, or other device, except a radio, shall be punished 
by a fine not exceeding two thousand five hundred dollars ($ 2,500), or 
imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year, or in the state 
prison, or by both that fine and imprisonment. 
Id. 
139 See generally Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Invasion 
of Privacy: Intrusion, First Amendment Handbook, available at 
http://www.rcfp.org/handbook/c02p02.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2005) 
(describing the intrusion tort). 
140 See Miller v. NBC, 187 Cal. App. 3d 1463, 1480 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) 
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physical and constructive invasion of privacy under California’s 
anti-paparazzi statute141 is significant because it: 
• identifies a number of specific, objective indicators or 
signals that a reasonable expectation of privacy exists in 
certain scenarios when hidden recording devices are used; 
• reflects an expansive interpretation of both the California 
Supreme Court’s decision in Sanders regarding privacy 
expectations142 and the state’s anti-paparazzi law; and 
                                                          
(defining the tort of trespass under California law). 
141 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8 (Deering 2004). The law was enacted after the 
death of Princess Diana and amid a public furor about the actions of so-called 
paparazzi. See generally Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, The Irony of News 
Coverage: How the Media Harm Their Own First Amendment Rights, 24 
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 215 (2002) (discussing the evolution of anti-
paparazzi legislation). California’s anti-paparazzi statute has two key 
components—one for physical invasions of privacy, the other for constructive 
invasions of privacy, with the former providing: 
A person is liable for physical invasion of privacy when the defendant 
knowingly enters onto the land of another without permission or 
otherwise committed a trespass, in order to physically invade the 
privacy of the plaintiff with the intent to capture any type of visual 
image, sound recording, or other physical impression of the plaintiff 
engaging in a personal or familial activity and the physical invasion 
occurs in a manner that is offensive to a reasonable person. 
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8 (a) (Deering 2004). 
 In addition to targeting physical invasions of privacy on personal or familial 
activities, the statute also restricts constructive invasions of privacy by 
providing: 
A person is liable for constructive invasion of privacy when the 
defendant attempts to capture, in a manner that is offensive to a 
reasonable person, any type of visual image, sound recording, or other 
physical impression of the plaintiff engaging in a personal or familial 
activity under circumstances in which the plaintiff had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, through the use of a visual or auditory 
enhancing device, regardless of whether there is a physical trespass, if 
this image, sound recording, or other physical impression could not 
have been achieved without a trespass unless the visual or auditory 
enhancing device was used. 
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8 (b) (Deering 2004). 
142 See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text. 
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• contains dicta suggesting that First Amendment protection 
for the use of hidden cameras is limited, especially when 
journalist-defendants freely admit during discovery that 
such surveillance techniques were not necessary to report 
the story in question. 
To better understand the potential implications of the Turnbull 
decision, however, it is first important to briefly review the 
underlying facts of the case. The 20/20 segment at issue focused on 
the activities of certain “casting workshops” in the Los Angeles 
area.143 The gist of the story was that these workshops for aspiring 
actors had very little educational or learning component to them, 
but instead, were merely paid opportunities for actors to meet and 
appear before casting directors. As such, the plaintiffs, most of 
whom were aspiring actors, contended that the 20/20 segment 
“made them look like ‘whores,’ or desperate losers on the fringe of 
the acting community in Los Angeles.”144 But because the causes 
of action focused on how the information for the segment was 
gathered rather than on the segment itself, the gravamen of the 
complaint was that the “[p]laintiffs object[ed] to the very fact that 
their presence at the workshop was recorded”145 and that private 
and embarrassing conversations were recorded. 
To obtain footage and audio at these workshops, ABC producer 
Yoruba Richen went undercover and attended several workshops, 
paying an admission fee to enter as if she too were an aspiring 
actress.146 It is undisputed that “Richen’s primary purpose in 
attending the workshops was to do a story on the workshops, not to 
practice her acting.”147 It also was undisputed that “Richen did not 
tell anyone at the workshops that she was wearing a hidden camera 
or planned to wear a hidden camera.”148 
While at the workshops, Richen recorded performances by the 
actors doing scenes for the casting directors and, more importantly, 
                                                          
143 Turnbull v. ABC, 32 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2442, 2445 (C.D. Cal. 
2004). 
144 Id. at 2445-46. 
145 Id. at 2447. 
146 Id. at 2446. 
147 Turnbull, 32 Media L. Rep. at 2447. 
148 Id. 
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secretly recorded “conversations between actors while they were 
waiting for performances to begin,”149 including “personal 
conversations between workshop participants to which Richen was 
not a party.”150 In one instance, she recorded a plaintiff-actor 
“making an offensive and overtly sexual comment to”151 another 
plaintiff-actor, while in another situation she captured one 
plaintiff-actor expressing something that she did not want the 
casting directors to know. Beyond this, Richen “even filmed a 
journey into the womens’ [sic] lavatory.”152 The tape also captured 
conversations “overheard from across the room as two people 
talk[ed] in a corner, or while their backs [were] turned to Ms. 
Richen, apparently unaware that an ABC News reporter [was] 
recording their every word.”153 
With these undisputed facts in mind, one can better understand 
the three significant aspects of Judge Otero’s opinion identified 
earlier in this section of the article. First, in holding that the 
plaintiffs had reasonable expectations of confidentiality and 
privacy in their communications at the workshops, the judge 
articulated a number of objective indicators of privacy that were 
manifested in the setting, the situation, and the behavior of the 
plaintiffs. This was all part of what Judge Otero called “a common 
sense approach”154 to privacy. These factors, which, if heeded, 
should help journalists avoid future lawsuits for privacy invasions, 
include: 
• Plaintiffs’ Body Language: In particular, in finding a 
conversational privacy expectation, Judge Otero noted that 
two of the plaintiffs “had their back[s] turned to”155 ABC’s 
producer, Richen, while the plaintiffs were talking among 
themselves. 
• Plaintiffs’ Distance and Location from Defendant: Judge 
                                                          
149 Id. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. 
152 Turnbull, 32 Media L. Rep. at 2447. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. at 2453 n.8. 
155 Id. at 2451. 
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Otero specifically observed that defendant “Richen was 
standing across the room”156 from the plaintiffs at the time 
she recorded one of their conversations. It also appeared to 
make a difference to the judge that the plaintiffs, during 
some conversations, were “in a corner”157 of a room. 
• Content of the Communications: Judge Otero’s opinion 
suggests that if the plaintiffs are engaged in a conversation 
that includes potentially embarrassing or offensive remarks, 
it may signal that they did not expect their conversation to 
be recorded. In particular, he emphasized that, in one 
instance, a plaintiff made an overtly sexual comment that 
“probably was not for Ms. Richen’s benefit.”158 
In addition, in another conversation recorded by Richen, a 
different plaintiff, Sharon Johnston, specifically said, “But 
they don’t have to know that.”159 For Judge Otero, this 
statement made it “clear”160 that the plaintiff “did not want 
her conversation disseminated outside of the intended 
audience.”161 As the judge wrote, “By stating ‘they don’t 
have to know that,’ Johnston was signaling her expectation 
of privacy.”162 
• Number of People in the Setting: In finding a privacy 
expectation, Judge Otero observed that the workshops 
“were small, consisting of 10 to 20 people,” and in many 
instances when conversations were recorded, “there were 
only two or three people in a room.”163 
• Custom of the Activities in the Setting: The very nature of 
the educational workshop at issue in the case also appeared 
to play an important role in the judge’s privacy calculus. In 
particular, Judge Otero wrote that “[i]t is not difficult to 
                                                          
156 Id. 
157 Turnbull, 32 Media L. Rep. at 2451. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. (emphasis in original).  
160 Id. 
161 Id. 
162 Turnbull, 32 Media L. Rep. at 2451. 
163 Id. 
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imagine a litany of classroom or workshop settings where 
the students might reasonably expect privacy.”164 In 
important dicta, Otero observed: 
Customarily, in law school and undergraduate 
university lectures, students must ask for the 
instructor’s permission prior to recording university 
lectures. Closer to the point, if a group of aspiring 
authors decided to attend a seminar with a writer in 
residence at a local university in order to obtain 
feedback and criticism regarding unfinished work, it 
would probably be reasonable for them to assume their 
activities, readings, and the instructor’s comments, 
were not being overheard by a person who was not 
similarly situated; let alone being recorded by a 
journalist.165 
What is interesting here is the suggestion that, in certain 
learning environments in which people voluntarily expose 
themselves to the risk of criticism from others (instructors 
or classmates) for the ultimate purpose of improving 
themselves based on feedback, they do not voluntarily 
expose themselves to a risk of recordation of their activities 
and conversations. 
• Admission and Entrance to the Setting: Judge Otero 
pointed out in his analysis of privacy expectations on the 
tort of intrusion that “the workshops were closed to the 
general public. To gain entry, a prospective participant had 
to audition, pay an entry fee and check-in.”166 He added 
that “[t]he workshops took place in a private room of a 
private building few actors know about.”167 In the judge’s 
view, the restrictions on the program’s accessibility 
seemingly added to the degree of privacy expected by 
workshop participants. 
                                                          
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. at 2453 n.9. 
167 Id. 
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Viewed collectively, the abovementioned laundry list of 
privacy factors that can be distilled from Judge Otero’s opinion 
should prove useful for journalists considering whether and when 
to use hidden cameras and microphones. Indeed, journalists should 
seriously consider incorporating these variables into their 
newsgathering policies and practices. 
In addition to these privacy variables, Judge Otero’s opinion is 
significant in its expansive reading of the Supreme Court of 
California’s holding in Sanders v. American Broadcasting 
Companies, Inc.168 In Sanders, the California high court held that 
“[a] person who lacks a reasonable expectation of complete 
privacy in a conversation because it could be seen and overheard 
by coworkers (but not the general public) may nevertheless have a 
claim for invasion of privacy by intrusion based on a television 
reporter’s covert videotaping of that conversation.”169 
Judge Otero extended this logic from the workplace setting of 
Sanders, which involved the tele-psychic industry, to the 
educational and classroom setting of Turnbull. This extension 
allowed Otero to conclude, in part, that the plaintiffs “could not 
have expected, as they talked amongst themselves in the corners or 
against the wall of the classroom, in their chairs awaiting class to 
begin, much less the ladies [sic] room, that a reporter was covertly 
recording their conversations.”170 
Judge Otero adopted a similarly expansive construction of 
California’s anti-paparazzi law and, in particular, its requirement 
that the alleged privacy invasion must relate to “the plaintiff 
engaging in a personal or familial activity.”171 Clearly the factual 
situation at issue in Turnbull did not involve “familial activity”; 
indeed, the workshops were all about acting and meeting casting 
directors. Thus, to receive the protection of California’s anti-
paparazzi law, the plaintiffs’ conduct at the casting workshops 
would have to be characterized as “personal activity.” The 
defendants contended in their summary judgment motion that ABC 
                                                          
168 20 Cal. 4th 907 (1999). 
169 Id. at 923. 
170 Turnbull, 32 Media L. Rep. at 2454. 
171 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8(a) (Deering 2004) (emphasis added). 
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producer Richen “did not record personal activity.”172 The judge, 
however, rejected this contention. In allowing the plaintiffs to 
proceed to trial on this statutory cause of action, Judge Otero ruled 
that the defendants “recorded personal conversations and other 
matters without permission.”173 This expansive reading of the anti-
paparazzi statute stretches the term “activity”174 to include 
conversations. The judge’s view thus rejects the existence of a 
conduct-versus-speech dichotomy that separates and distinguishes 
an activity from a conversation. Under this interpretation, personal 
conversations, not just personal activities, fall within the ambit of 
California Civil Code Section 1708.8. This interpretation 
represents an important victory for privacy advocates. 
Finally, the third significant aspect of Judge Otero’s summary 
judgment ruling in Turnbull is the following statement made by the 
judge: “[T]here is no point in according First Amendment 
protection in the instant case because Defendants freely admit that 
they would have gone ahead with the same story even if secret 
camera footage was unavailable.”175 
If this proposition really is true, as Judge Otero believes it is, 
then Turnbull’s implications for hidden-camera journalists and 
producers are profound: if the same story can be told regardless of 
whether hidden cameras are used, then journalists should not 
expect the First Amendment to come to their rescue if they are 
sued for invasions of privacy based on the use of hidden cameras. 
Likewise, journalists and producers should never admit in 
depositions or affidavits that they could have told the same story or 
would have done the same story without the hidden surveillance 
devices. Indeed, Judge Otero cited the deposition testimony of 
Brian Ross, the chief investigative correspondent at ABC and “one 
of the individuals who decided to do the story and decided to use 
hidden cameras for the program,”176 as proof that “Ross would not 
have scrapped the story if he could not have used hidden 
                                                          
172 Turnbull, 32 Media L. Rep. at 2456. 
173 Id. (emphasis added). 
174 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8 (Deering 2004) (emphasis added). 
175 Turnbull, 32 Media L. Rep. at 2458 (emphasis added). 
176 Id. at 2448. 
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cameras.”177 To some extent, then, ABC was done in by its own 
words. 
Judge Otero’s statement further suggests that the First 
Amendment will come to journalists’ defense in such situations if 
hidden cameras were the only way to tell the story. This forces 
news producers and in-house media counsel to make very tough 
choices about how to cover stories and whether to risk the use of 
hidden cameras. Turnbull advises that a true journalistic and legal 
cost-benefit analysis is in order for those in the newsrooms and 
executive suites of the broadcast networks. 
In summary, Judge Otero’s summary judgment ruling in 
Turnbull, although of precedential value today in only one federal 
district court, contains reasoning, logic, and analysis that, if 
adopted by other courts, may have significant ramifications for 
journalism policies and practices in the future. In the interim, the 
laundry list of privacy-expectation signals identified by the judge 
should prove useful for journalists in guiding their own conduct in 
future investigative-report scenarios. 
V. PRIVACY IN SOURCE-REPORTER RELATIONSHIPS:                          
THE DIFFICULTY OF KEEPING CONFIDENCES IN 2004 
This article so far has illustrated how privacy concerns often 
prevailed in 2004 against the interests of both journalists and the 
public’s right to know. It thus is more than a little bit ironic that, 
when journalists in 2004 asserted their own privacy interests—in 
particular, the right to keep private and secret the names of their 
confidential sources—they were thoroughly rebuffed and rebuked 
by the judiciary. In fact, as the author of this article and a colleague 
wrote in a newspaper commentary in November 2004, “[t]he list of 
reporters now facing jail time for refusing to disclose a source’s 
identity grows longer each day.”178 
Chief among those journalists was Jim Taricani, an 
investigative television journalist for NBC-affiliate WJAR, 
                                                          
177 Id. at 2458. 
178 Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, Keeping Public Confidences; It’s 
Time for a Federal Shield Law Protecting Journalists from Source Revelation, 
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 30, 2004, at A-21. 
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Channel 10, in Providence, Rhode Island, who was held in both 
civil and criminal contempt in November 2004.179 In particular, 
Taricani was convicted of criminal contempt for refusing to reveal 
the identity of the person who leaked to him a copy of an FBI 
surveillance videotape showing a bribe being accepted by a 
Providence city official.180 The tape, which Taricani’s station aired 
on February 1, 2001,181 had been under seal by a court, and thus, 
the person who leaked it to the reporter violated a court order.182 
U.S. District Court Judge Ernest C. Torres appointed Marc DeSisto 
as a special prosecutor to try “to find out who gave Taricani the 
secret videotape.”183 
Taricani’s November criminal conviction followed a decision 
earlier that same year by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit affirming a civil contempt ruling and holding that Taricani 
did not have a First Amendment privilege or right to refuse to 
reveal his source to DeSisto.184 The decision was not surprising. 
Although thirty-one states now have shield laws that grant 
journalists varying degrees of protection against testifying about 
certain confidential information in their possession,185 there is no 
                                                          
179 See generally Lynne Tuohy, Reporter Convicted; Shielded Source, 
HARTFORD COURANT, Nov. 19, 2004, at A1 (providing an excellent overview of 
the battles Taricani faced for protecting his source). 
180 Pam Belluck, Reporter Is Found Guilty for Refusal to Name Source, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2004, at A24. 
181 Tuohy, supra note 179, at A1. 
182 See Eileen McNamara, Journalists Under Attack, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 
21, 2004, at B1 (writing that “[w]hoever leaked the videotape to Taricani, 
though, did so in violation of a court order that all such materials were to be 
sealed”). 
183 Tracy Breton, Taricani Told to Reveal Source or Risk Prison, 
PROVIDENCE J., Nov. 5, 2004, at A-01. 
184 In re Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 2004). 
185 See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (setting forth California’s shield 
law); see generally DON R. PEMBER & CLAY CALVERT, 2005-2006 EDITION 
MASS MEDIA LAW 390-93 (2005) (discussing state shield laws); Reporters 
Committee for Freedom of the Press, The Reporter’s Privilege Compendium: An 
Introduction, available at http://www.rcfp.org/cgi-local/privilege/item. cgi?i= 
intro (last visited Jan. 16, 2005). 
[Thirty-one] states and the District of Columbia have enacted statutes—
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federal shield law to protect source privacy; in fact, in the only 
instance in which the U.S. Supreme Court has considered a 
possible constitutional privilege, the Court rejected a First 
Amendment privilege for journalists to refuse to testify before 
grand juries.186 
After the appellate court’s ruling, Judge Torres began fining 
Taricani $1,000 per day, hoping that the civil contempt remedy 
would persuade Taricani to give up his source.187 Some $85,000 in 
paid fines later, Torres switched tactics from civil to criminal 
contempt.188 
Why did Taricani refuse to reveal his source to the special 
prosecutor? As the Emmy Award-winning journalist explained 
outside the courthouse after his conviction, 
I wish all my sources could be on the record, but when 
people are afraid, a promise of confidentiality may be the 
only way to get the information to the public, and in some 
cases, to protect the well-being of the source. I made a 
                                                          
shield laws—that give journalists some form of privilege against 
compelled production of confidential or unpublished information. The 
laws vary in detail and scope from state to state, but generally give 
greater protection to journalists than the state or federal constitution, 
according to many courts. 
Id. 
186 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). See In re Special 
Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37, 44 (1st Cir. 2004) (writing that “[i]n Branzburg, the 
Supreme Court flatly rejected any notion of a general-purpose reporter’s 
privilege for confidential sources, whether by virtue of the First Amendment or 
of a newly hewn common law privilege”). 
187 See Tracy Breton, Taricani Could Face Harsher Sanctions, 
PROVIDENCE J., Sept. 30, 2004, at A-01 (describing the court-imposed, $1,000-
per-day fine on Taricani, and how it was being paid everyday by a check 
“delivered to the clerk of the U.S. District Court—written from a bank account 
of Channel 10 investigative reporter Jim Taricani”). 
188 See Belluck, supra note 180, at A24 (writing that “Taricani was fined 
$1,000 for each day he continued to refuse to name his source” and, when he 
refused to relent “after he had paid $85,000—for which he was reimbursed by 
his employer—Judge Torres changed the civil contempt case into a criminal 
contempt case”). 
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promise to my source, which I intend to keep.189 
Taricani’s promise of privacy to his source, however, 
ultimately resulted in six months of home confinement—the 
sentence Judge Torres meted out in December 2004 for the 
criminal contempt conviction.190 
Taricani was not the only journalist under a determined judicial 
assault in 2004 aimed at compelling the revelation of his sources. 
In fact, as a reporter for the Boston Globe summarized the situation 
in late 2004: 
This past summer, five reporters were found in contempt 
for refusing to disclose sources used in reporting on Wen 
Ho Lee, the former nuclear scientist who was the suspect in 
an espionage case.191 And leaked information from the 
BALCO steroid grand jury investigation could leave some 
Bay Area reporters facing penalties for not revealing their 
sources.192 
In the BALCO situation, which centered on alleged steroid use 
by individuals such as baseball superstars Barry Bonds and Jason 
Giambi, U.S. Attorney Kevin V. Ryan asked journalists from the 
San Francisco Chronicle to reveal their sources for leaked grand 
jury testimony.193 By early 2005, the Chronicle’s editor, Phil 
Bronstein, maintained that the newspaper would not give up its 
confidential sources, stating that “[t]he press has certain 
responsibilities in society, but one of them is not to enforce the 
provisions of the federal grand jury system. Obviously, there are 
people who disagree with that, including the Justice Department. 
                                                          
189 Id. 
190 W. Zachary Malinowski, Taricani Won’t Appeal Punishment, 
PROVIDENCE J., Dec. 22, 2004, at B-03. 
191 Lee v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 327 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.D.C. 2004). The five 
journalists in that case were Bob Drogin of the Los Angeles Times, H. Josef 
Hebert of the Associated Press, Jeff Gerth and James Risen of The New York 
Times, and Pierre Thomas, a former CNN reporter who now works for ABC 
News. Id. at 27 n.1. 
192 Mark Jurkowitz, Journalists Push for a State Shield Law, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Dec. 21, 2004, at D1. 
193 John M. Broder, From Grand Jury Leaks Comes a Clash of Rights, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 15, 2005, at A8. 
CALVERT MACROED CORRECTED 060605.DOC 6/20/2005  7:10 PM 
690 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
But that’s not the view from here.”194 
Two other major cases from 2004 involving the journalistic 
desire to keep private the identities of sources both pivot on the 
question of who leaked and disclosed the name of covert CIA 
operative Valerie Plame in July 2003 to several members of the 
media, including Robert Novak.195 Novak later blew Plame’s cover 
by printing her name in his syndicated column that same month. 
Novak cited his sources for the scoop on Plame’s employment as 
“two senior administration officials,”196 neither of whom he 
identified. It is a violation of federal law to reveal the names of 
covert CIA agents, and the Justice Department named a special 
prosecutor, U.S. Attorney Patrick J. Fitzgerald, to conduct a grand 
jury investigation into who leaked Plame’s name to Novak. With 
Novak refusing to tell anyone whether he had even spoken with the 
special prosecutor or was cooperating with the government 
investigation,197 Fitzgerald soon began “aggressively taking on 
other journalists who reported on the story.”198 Among those 
journalists was Time magazine’s Matthew Cooper and, although 
she never wrote a story on the matter, The New York Times’s 
Judith Miller.199 In November 2004, U.S. District Court Judge 
Thomas F. Hogan refused to quash a subpoena served on Cooper 
                                                          
194 Id. 
195 See generally Lorne Manly & Adam Liptak, At Leak Inquiry’s Center, a 
Circumspect Columnist, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2004, at A18 (providing a 
thorough overview of the facts and legal issues in the dispute). 
196 See Adam Liptak, Judges Skeptical of First Amendment Protection for 
Reporters in C.I.A. Leak Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2004, at A28 (“Robert 
Novak, the syndicated columnist, was the first to disclose Ms. Plame’s identity 
publicly, in a column published on July 14, 2003. He had been told, he wrote, by 
‘two senior administration officials’ seeking to cast doubt on an opinion column 
by Ms. Plame’s husband, Joseph C. Wilson IV, a former diplomat.”). 
197 See Charles Duhigg, Media Law; Robert Novak: How Does He Stay Out 
of Jail, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2004, at Opinion M6 (describing how Novak has 
managed to escape the same wrath that has faced Matthew Cooper and Judith 
Miller). 
198 Richard B. Schmitt, The Nation; Prosecutor’s Lips Still Sealed in Probe 
of Leaked Information, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2004, at A10. 
199 See Punishing the Press, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2004, at A28 (writing 
that Miller “never wrote a single article about the Plame controversy”). 
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and Time, writing: 
Mr. Cooper and Time have no privilege based in the First 
Amendment or common law, qualified or otherwise, 
excusing them from providing documents to or testifying 
before the grand jury in this matter. Therefore, Mr. Cooper 
and Time must fulfill their obligations to answer valid 
subpoenas issued to them by a grand jury acting in good 
faith.200 
This decision followed an earlier August 2004 order holding 
Cooper in civil contempt and fining Time $1,000 per day until it 
handed over the subpoenaed documents.201 Judith Miller’s motion 
to quash the subpoena of Fitzgerald also was rejected by Judge 
Hogan.202 Similar to his finding with Matthew Cooper, Judge 
Hogan opined that Miller “has no privilege, based in the First 
Amendment or common law, qualified or otherwise, excusing her 
from testifying before the grand jury in this matter. . . . Ms. Miller 
must fulfill her obligation, shared by all citizens, to answer a valid 
subpoena issued to her by a grand jury acting in good faith.”203 
With both Cooper and Miller facing up to eighteen months in jail 
for refusing to disclose their sources, the reporters and their news 
organizations took their case to a federal appellate court in 
December 2004.204 The three-judge panel seemed skeptical during 
oral argument of granting a privilege to Cooper and Miller,205 and 
in February of 2005, it ruled against the journalistic duo.206 The 
                                                          
200 In re Special Counsel Investigation, 346 F. Supp. 2d 54, 56 (D.D.C. 
2004). 
201 In re Special Counsel Investigation, 332 F. Supp. 2d 33 (D.D.C. 2004). 
202 In re Special Counsel Investigation, 338 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 2004). 
203 Id. at 19. 
204 See Richard B. Schmitt, A Sign of Hope for Reporters in CIA Leak Case, 
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2004, at A22 (describing the arguments before the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia). 
205 See Carol D. Leonnig, Judges Weigh Press Freedoms, WASH. POST, 
Dec. 9, 2004, at A11 (describing how “Judge David B. Sentelle grew visibly 
irritated as he repeatedly asked longtime First Amendment lawyer Floyd 
Abrams to explain how Cooper and Miller’s circumstances differed from those 
of the Kentucky reporter”). 
206 In re Grand Jury Subpoena, No. 04-3138, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 2494 
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appellate court wrote that “there is no First Amendment privilege 
protecting the evidence sought, but no decision had been reached 
by the end of the year,”207 and it added that “if any such common 
law privilege exists, it is not absolute, and in this case has been 
overcome by the filings of the Special Counsel with the District 
Court.”208 
In situations such as those involving Taricani, Cooper, and 
Miller, the First Amendment interest in privacy of information—
privacy of source identity, in particular—is clear. As veteran media 
defense attorney James C. Goodale observed, what journalists such 
as “Taricani are fighting for is the right to do their job. They 
cannot do it without confidential sources.”209 And what is that job? 
New York Times columnist William Safire summed it up well in a 
recent commentary calling for a privilege for journalistic source 
confidentiality when he wrote that “it is the publication’s 
obligation to the public to publish what it considers newsworthy—
and not to assist the government in punishing the provider of that 
news.”210 
Indeed, a promise of privacy to a source is sometimes the only 
way that a journalist such as Taricani can obtain what Safire terms 
“newsworthy” information. A journalist who burns such a source 
by breaching that promise harms not only himself and the source, 
but all journalists and, more importantly, the public in general.211 
As Eileen McNamara of the Boston Globe wrote in 2004, 
breaching a promise of confidentiality “undermine[s] the work of 
                                                          
(D.C. Cir. Feb. 15, 2005). 
207 Id. at *2. 
208 Id. 
209 James C. Goodale, Communications and Media Law; Why Reporters Go 
to Jail, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 3, 2004, at 3. 
210 William Safire, Judges as Plumbers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2004, at 
A27. 
211  Cf. Maggie Mulvihill, As You Were Saying . . . This Journalist Stands 
Tall Rather Than Give Up a Source, BOSTON HERALD, July 3, 2004, at 16 
(writing that “no governmental whistleblower would confide in a reporter if he 
thought the reporter were in cahoots with prosecutors or would blow his cover” 
and pointing out that “so much that the public should know would remain secret 
if reporters didn’t keep their promises and refrain from ratting out their 
confidential sources to the government”).  
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all journalists by discouraging people in sensitive situations from 
sharing information about wrongdoing with reporters. Journalists 
would always prefer to put their sources on the record, but there 
are instances in which such candor could cost a source his job or 
his physical safety.”212 
The situation was so bad that, in November 2004, U.S. Senator 
Christopher Dodd (D–Conn.) introduced a bill titled “The Free 
Speech Protection Act of 2004,” which was designed to create a 
federal shield law to protect individuals and organizations involved 
in gathering and disseminating news from being hauled into 
federal court and forced to disclose their sources or other 
unpublished information.213 In proposing the measure, Dodd 
contended that “[w]hen the public’s right to know is threatened, 
and when the rights of free speech and free press are at risk, all of 
the other liberties we hold dear are endangered.”214 In a January 
2005 opinion piece published in the Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 
Dodd elaborated on this argument, writing: 
If reporters are unable to promise confidentiality to their 
sources, many conscientious citizens will choose not to 
come forward with information out of fear for their jobs, 
their reputations, even their lives. The public’s ability to 
hold those in power accountable—whether in the 
government or in the private sector—will be severely 
compromised. In a real sense, when the public’s right to 
know is threatened, so are all of the other liberties we hold 
dear.215 
There was good reason to think that the public would support 
the measure; a national survey of more than 650 adults conducted 
in October 2004 on behalf the First Amendment Center in 
Nashville, Tennessee, found that seventy-two percent of 
respondents either strongly or mildly agreed with the statement 
                                                          
212 McNamara, supra note 182, at B1. 
213 S. 3020, 108th Cong. (2004). 
214 Andy Thibault, Good Time to be Enemy of the State, CONN. L. TRIB., 
Jan. 10, 2005, at 20. 
215 Christopher J. Dodd, Public’s Right to Know on Endangered List, 
ATLANTA J.-CONST., Jan. 15, 2005, at 11A. 
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that “journalists should be allowed to keep a news source 
confidential.”216 
Dodd’s proposal for congressional action clearly had the 
support of the mainstream news media. In an editorial in 
November 2004, the Washington Post opined: 
Mr. Taricani’s case unfortunately is not unusual at all. It is 
part of a rash of recent cases in which judges are seeking to 
force journalists to renege on promises of confidentiality, 
using the threat of jail as leverage. Without such promises, 
much good journalism wouldn’t happen. If the federal 
courts will not recognize a privilege for reporters such as 
Mr. Taricani, as most states do, Congress needs to step in 
and do it for them.217 
If Congress does indeed act in 2005, it will represent a battle 
between the legislative and judicial branches of government, with 
the latter coming down squarely against the privilege in 2004 in 
the cases of Jim Taricani, Matthew Cooper, and Judith Miller. This 
clear preference for disclosure over source protection raises the 
question: Why is there such reluctance on the part of judges to 
extend a privacy privilege to journalists to protect their sources? 
Why was there in 2004, as William Safire puts it, a “sudden wave 
of judicial repression”218 of reporters? Mark Jurkowitz of the 
Boston Globe observes that while “First Amendment advocates say 
that privilege is vital to the free flow of information . . . some of 
the public seems more skeptical, viewing journalists as putting 
themselves above the law.”219 Might such skepticism be present 
among judges who might see journalists as too often intruding on 
others’ privacy in order to get information to sell newspapers? In 
other words, if there is a perception among judges that journalists 
push the boundaries of other people’s privacy rights in the name of 
                                                          
216 First Amendment Center, 2004 Confidential-Sources Survey, available 
at http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/about.aspx?item=2004_confidential_ 
sources (last visited Jan. 16, 2004). See Richards & Calvert, supra note 178, at 
A-21 (citing the survey finding). 
217 Jailing Reporters, WASH. POST, Nov. 28, 2004, at B06. 
218 Safire, supra note 210, at A27. 
219 Mark Jurkowitz, Departures Anchored the Year’s Top Media Stories, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 26, 2004, at N10. 
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newsgathering and reporting, then why should judges not show 
them how it feels to have their private information revealed? 
CONCLUSION 
If the judicial opinions and statutes described and analyzed in 
this article were tallied up on a mythical legal scoreboard in a 
contest pitting privacy advocates against working journalists, it 
would show a decisive victory for privacy in 2004 and an 
overwhelming defeat for the press. As discussed in this article: 
• A right to personal privacy was extended by Congress, 
albeit in limited circumstances, to people in public places 
under the Video Voyeurism Prevention Act of 2004; 
• A right to personal privacy also was extended, in certain 
federal FOIA actions, by the U.S. Supreme Court to the 
family members and close relatives of the dead who, for 
obvious reasons, could not assert their own privacy claims; 
• The press was not allowed to print, because of privacy 
concerns, the contents of truthful documents that it had 
lawfully obtained in the Kobe Bryant sexual assault case; 
• The press was prohibited from obtaining access, also 
because of privacy concerns accompanied by right-to-fair-
trial issues, to basic and fundamental information about a 
criminal case pending against one of the world’s most well-
known celebrities, Michael Jackson; 
• The use of journalistic hidden cameras and microphones 
that intrude on personal privacy was rebuked by a federal 
court judge who took, as was noted earlier, what he called a 
“common sense”220 approach to privacy that rejected a 
media summary judgment motion and allowed numerous 
privacy-based causes of action to proceed to trial. 
When journalists, however, asserted their own privacy rights—
in particular, the right to keep private the identity of their 
confidential sources—they lost in several high-profile cases, such 
as those involving Jim Taricani, Matthew Cooper, and Judith 
                                                          
220 See supra note 154 and accompanying text. 
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Miller. 
What does all of this mean? For the news media, the 
preponderance of judicial opinions and legislation against it in 
2004 may reflect the findings of an independent survey conducted 
that same year revealing a growing belief among the public that, as 
compared to their counterparts from years past, modern 
“journalists are sloppier, less professional, less moral, less caring, 
more biased, less honest about their mistakes, and generally more 
harmful to democracy.”221 Judges and legislators may harbor these 
very same beliefs about the press—legislators, of course, often 
pander to public sentiment to win elections, whether or not they 
agree with those sentiments—and this may be influencing their 
actions. There just might be then a disturbing correlation here for 
journalists: less trust in the press may lead to fewer favorable 
judicial rulings and less favorable legislation. The less-trust side of 
the equation is clear,222 and the negative legal side has been 
illustrated amply with multiple examples in this article. 
While the news media devote a great amount of time to hand-
wringing about whether there is a liberal news media bias,223 as do 
others involved in the media,224 perhaps the media’s time would be 
                                                          
221 Mark Jurkowitz, Media Distrust May Be Libel-Case Key, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Jan. 9, 2005, at B1 (quoting from a “major study released in March 
2004 by the Project for Excellence in Journalism”). 
222 See David Weddle, Swagland, L.A. TIMES MAG., Jan. 16, 2005, at 14 
(writing that “[a] recent Gallup poll found that only 21% of those surveyed rated 
newspaper reporters’ ethical standards as high or very high. Journalists ranked 
lower than bankers, auto mechanics, elected officials and nursing home 
operators”). 
223 See, e.g., Joe Strupp et al., The Liberal Media: Myth or Reality?, 
EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Aug. 1, 2004 (providing a comprehensive analysis of 
both data and opinions regarding a potential liberal bias in the news media). 
224 See, e.g., ERIC ALTERMAN, WHAT LIBERAL MEDIA? THE TRUTH ABOUT 
BIAS AND THE NEWS (2003) (attempting to refute allegations that there is a 
liberal bias in the media); BERNARD GOLDBERG, ARROGANCE: RESCUING 
AMERICA FROM THE MEDIA ELITE (2003) (setting forth multiple instances of 
what the former reporter for CBS News believes is a liberal bias in the 
mainstream news media, including, most notably, The New York Times); 
BERNARD GOLDBERG, BIAS: A CBS INSIDER EXPOSES HOW THE MEDIA DISTORT 
THE NEWS (2002) (providing examples that the author contends illustrate a 
liberal bias in the media). 
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better spent now focusing on the specific conduct and actions that 
tend to erode respect for the news media while simultaneously 
elevating judicial and legislative respect for privacy rights. 
Journalists, in other words, cannot sit back and simply blame 
pandering politicians and judges for their current state of woe. 
Instead, a self-examination of their own actions may point them 
out of this mess and toward a reasonable solution. If journalists 
expect a right of privacy in their own relationships with sources 
(think Jim Taricani and Matthew Cooper), then they may need to 
be more careful about intruding on the privacy interests of others. 
The solution, of course, must strike a balance that respects 
privacy rights, but that allows journalists to perform their roles in a 
democratic society. To achieve this balance, journalists must 
educate the public (judges and legislators included) through their 
actions, and not simply their pontifications in self-serving 
editorials and commentaries, about the importance of their roles as 
both watchdogs of government abuses of power225 and   conveyors 
of truthful and accurate news.226 The proper location of the 
fulcrum in this delicate privacy-versus-reporter balance is, of 
course, difficult to precisely pinpoint; however, it is clear that in 
2004 more judicial and legislative weight was placed on the side of 
personal privacy than on the side of journalists and reporters. The 
press must now convince judges and legislators that the policy 
interest in protecting a free press in a democratic society requires 
shifting that balance back to a point that affords journalists greater 
access to information and greater freedom to report the material 
that they lawfully obtain. 
 
                                                          
225 See Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991) (observing that 
“[t]he press plays a unique role as a check on government abuse” and “as a 
watchdog of government activity”). 
226 See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text (describing this role). 
